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resulting from deduction of interest on income tax
returns); Ltr. Rul. 8429008, April 5, 1984.
15 Rev. Rul. 80-159, 1980-1 C.B. 206 (no reduction of
marital deduction).
16 Id.
17 89 T.C. 1193 (1987). Compare Est. of Hubert v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 22 (1993) (administration
expenses did not reduce marital or charitable deduction).
18 Id.
19 Rev. Rul. 93-48, I.R.B. 1993-25, 9.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The debtor filed a Chapter 11
case and the debtor’s attorneys claimed that during the case,
the debtor was able to produce a crop because of the legal
efforts of the attorneys. The crop was sold and the proceeds
placed in escrow but the case was later dismissed. The
attorneys claimed a portion of the proceeds under the
Nebraska Attorney Lien statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108.
The court held that the statute did not apply because the
proceeds were not held by an adverse party. The court also
held that any claim to the proceeds as an administrative
expense in the bankruptcy case was lost when the case was
dismissed. Matter of Olson, 161 B.R. 45 (D. Neb. 1992),
aff’g, 101 B.R. 134 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
AUTOMATIC STAY. In exchange for a delay in the
sale of collateral farmland, the debtor had agreed in a pre-
petition foreclosure case to allow the judgment creditor
immediate relief from the automatic stay if the debtor filed
for bankruptcy. The debtor operated several businesses and
planned to use income from the land to fund the 100 percent
payment Chapter 11 plan. The judgment creditor sought
enforcement of the pre-petition agreement and relief from
the automatic stay to sell the land. The court held that the
pre-petition agreement alone was insufficient to require
relief from the automatic stay absent a showing of bad faith
on the part of the debtor. The court upheld the denial of
relief from the automatic stay because no bad faith was
shown and the property was necessary for a successful
reorganization. Farm Credit of Central Florida v. Polk,
160 B.R. 870 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The debtor
had leased land for its manufacturing business from a third
party. The debtor moved its business to another location and
eventually filed for Chapter 11. After the filing, the New
Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection and Energy
(NJSEPE) discovered a hidden illegal seepage pit. After the
claims bar date, the NJSEPE issued an administrative order
and penalty assessment requiring the debtor to clean the pit
and assessing the debtor a penalty. The debtor sought to
avoid the order and penalty as untimely claims. The court
held that the order and penalty were not claims because the
cleanup involved an ongoing threat to the environment, the
state was not seeking reimbursement for cleanup costs, and
the order and penalty were an attempt by the state to force
the debtor to comply with environmental laws. In re
Torwico Electronics, Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors and trustee entered
into a court approved agreement to sell the debtors’
homestead to the debtors for the amount which would have
passed to the estate upon the sale of the property. The
agreement and order acknowledged the debtors’ exemption
and judgment and tax liens against the property. After
purchasing the property from the estate, the debtors sought
to avoid one of the judgment liens as impairing the
homestead exemption. The court held that the court
approved agreement was res judicata as to the debtors as to
the value of the residence and the amount of the liens and
any impairment of the exemption. In re Glenn, 160 B.R.
837 (Bankr. S.D. Calif. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. Seven years before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor transferred a residence to a business
associate in an attempt to shield the house from tax liens.
The debtor continued to have possession and control over
the property and made the payments on loans secured by the
property. The court held that the transfer was fraudulent
given the attempts to hide the true nature of the transaction
and the transfer was made when the debtor was insolvent;
therefore, the debtor was denied the use of the homestead
exemption for fraudulent pre-bankruptcy planning. The
court rejected any requirement that the fraud occur in
contemplation of filing bankruptcy; therefore, the fact that
the fraud occurred seven years before the filing had no
affect on the eligibility of the debtor for the exemption. In
re Curry, 160 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
The debtor purchased an undivided interest in 150 acres
of rural land owned by the debtor’s family. A portion of the
land was platted and subdivided and offered for sale in units
of one to five acres. The rest of the land was left idle with
the intent to use it for further development once the platted
portion was sold. The debtor conveyed 5.5 acres of the
platted land to the debtor’s spouse and the couple built a
house on the land for use as their residence. The debtor
claimed the 5.5 acre residence, the debtor’s interest in the
platted acres and the debtor’s interest in the unplatted acres
as a rural homestead exemption under Tex. Prop. Code §
41.002(b)(1). The court held that the 5.5 acres was qualified
for the homestead exemption but that the platted and
unplatted property was not entitled to the exemption
because the debtor’s intent to sell that property existed
before the debtor established a residence on a portion of the
land. In re McCain, 160 B.R. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
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CLAIMS. The debtor’s plan provided for payment of
secured claims, including a secured claim for federal
income taxes. Over one year after the bar date for claims,
the IRS filed an unsecured claim for taxes. The court held
that the late filed claim would not be allowed. In re
Leichter, 161 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993).
The IRS filed a timely claim for priority taxes from the
debtor’s 1978-1988 and 1990 tax years. The IRS filed an
untimely claim for priority taxes for 1978 through 1987 and
1989 taxable years. The court held that the untimely claims
would be allowed as amendments of the timely filed claims
because the taxes involved were of the same type. In re
Leland, 160 B.R. 834 (Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1993).
The IRS had filed a timely priority unsecured claim for
1989 and 1990 taxes owed by the debtors. One year after
the bar date for filing claims, the IRS filed a “supplemental”
priority unsecured claim for 1988 taxes owed by the
debtors. The court held that the late filed claim would not
be allowed as an amendment of the timely filed claim
because the untimely claim was for separate taxable years.
In re Chavis, 160 B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
DISCHARGE. In 1979, the debtor attended a tax
protester seminar and decided to use the lecturer’s methods
for evading payment of federal income taxes. The debtor
failed to file for 1979 through 1986 despite repeated notices
and assessments from the IRS. The debtor had filed and
paid taxes prior to 1979 and started filing and paying taxes
after 1986 after seeking legal advice. The court held that the
taxes for 1979 through 1986 were nondischargeable for
willful attempts to evade taxes. In re Laurin, 161 B.R. 73
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1993).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. After the debtor had
received a discharge, the IRS improperly setoff the debtor’s
tax refunds against some of the discharged taxes. The
debtor obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court
holding the IRS in civil contempt and granting the debtor
attorney’s fees. The IRS appealed, arguing that under U.S.
v. Nordic Village, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992), it had not waived
its sovereign immunity against suits for monetary damages.
The court held that the award of attorney’s fees was allowed
under I.R.C. § 7430. U.S. v. Kolb, 161 B.R. 30 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
The debtors had created a bank account for use as an
operating account during the bankruptcy case. After the
debtors received their discharge, the IRS levied against the
bank account and the debtors sought to recover the funds,
arguing that the levies violated the automatic stay. The
court held that it had no jurisdiction in that, under U.S. v.
Nordic Village, the IRS had not waived its sovereign
immunity against suits for monetary recoveries. In addition,
the court held that the levies did not violate the automatic
stay which had expired when the debtors received their
discharge. Quillen v. U.S., 160 B.R. 776 (W.D.Va. 1993).
CONTRACTS
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. The plaintiff had
contracted with the defendant to purchase an Arabian mare
owned by the defendant. After the final contract payment
was made, the defendant refused to sign over the
registration papers for the mare, claiming that all payments
had not been made. The dispute lasted six years, ending
with the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of the
contract and damages resulting from the delay in
performance. The court held that the jury award of damages
and the trial court’s order for specific performance were
both allowed where the damages occurred from the delay in
the performance. The court also upheld the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claim of violation of the S.C. Unfair Trade
Practices Act in that the defendant’s action were not
susceptible to repetition and did not impact on a public
interest. Perry v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 150 (S.C. Ct. App.
1993).
WARRANTY-ALM § 13.02.* The plaintiff was a farm
corporation which grew potatoes. The plaintiff purchased a
nematicide manufactured by one defendant and sold by
another defendant. The nematicide worked for two seasons
but apparently failed to control nematodes in the third crop
year and the plaintiff sued for breach of express and implied
warranties. The plaintiff alleged that the seller orally
claimed that the nematicide would control nematodes and
produce better potato crops. The court held that these
allegations were sufficient evidence of an oral express
warranty to defeat a summary judgment. The seller claimed
that the implied warranties were disclaimed in written
disclaimers on the bills of sale, the packaging and the
delivery trucks and that the existence of these disclaimers
over several years of dealings between the parties
represented a course of dealing. The court agreed that the
implied warranties were sufficiently disclaimed by the
course of dealing between the parties. Tolmie Farms v.
J.R. Simplot Co., 862 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1993), aff’g, 862
P.2d 305 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992).
CORPORATIONS
DEADLOCK. The plaintiff and defendant were
brothers and each owned 50 percent of a farm corporation.
The plaintiff wanted the corporation to borrow money for
operating expenses, commodity hedging and equipment
purchases but the defendant wanted to borrow money only
as a last resort. As a consequence, no board meetings were
held and the plaintiff was forced to use his own funds to
finance business opportunities for the corporation. The
plaintiff sued for court ordered dissolution of the
corporation. The court held that the deadlock of the
shareholders and the risks required to be taken by the
plaintiff for which the defendant benefitted were sufficient
support for a court ordered dissolution of the corporation.
The court also held that because dissolution was not
required in order to protect a shareholder’s interests in the
corporation, the corporation was not entitled to buy out the
plaintiff’s interest at fair market value. Foster v. Foster
Farms, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
plaintiffs had a delinquent loan with the FmHA and applied
for debt restructuring. The FmHA denied the restructuring
but the county supervisor offered the plaintiffs the right to
purchase their debt for the $79,836 recovery value of their
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loan. The state supervisor had approved the recovery value
determination but not the offer. Two days later, the
plaintiffs’ two hen houses were destroyed by a snowstorm
and six days later, the plaintiffs received an insurance check
for $264,000. The FmHA recalculated the recovery value of
the loan as $306,365 and the plaintiffs appealed this
decision, arguing that the FmHA was bound by the earlier
determination. The court held that the amended net recovery
determination was valid because 7 C.F.R. § 1951.903(b)
required the state director’s approval before any net
recovery value buy-out offer is final. The plaintiffs also
argued that the increased net recovery determination was
improper, under 7 U.S.C. § 2001(c)(4), because the
determination was made more than 60 days after the debt
restructuring application was made. The court held that the
FmHA still had authority to make a final authorized net
recovery determination because the statute did not specify
any consequences of a failure to provide the net recovery
determination within 60 days of an application. The court
also held that allowing the late determination furthered the
statutory purpose of maximizing the FmHA recovery.
Kinion v. U.S., 8 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 1993).
CONSERVATION. The ASCS has issued proposed
regulations incorporating the Water Quality Incentive
Project into the Agricultural Conservation Program. 59 Fed.
Reg. 1293 (Jan. 10, 1994).
DISASTER PAYMENTS-ALM § 10.03[4].* The
plaintiffs suffered a disaster loss of their crops in 1988 and
applied for and received disaster payments. The ASCS later
determined that the plaintiffs were not eligible for the
disaster payments because the plaintiffs’ non-farm gross
revenues exceeded $2 million and more than 50 percent of
the plaintiffs’ income was from non-farming activities. The
plaintiffs argued that the ASCS regulations defining
“person” for purposes of eligibility were improper because
the definition used the same definition as was used for
payment limitations. The court held that the definition
borrowing was permissible because the purpose of the $2
million limitation on eligibility was the same as the purpose
for the payment limitation, to limit benefits to smaller
farmers who rely most heavily on agricultural operations.
Hanson v. Espy, 8 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 788 F.
Supp. 403 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
FARM LOANS. In an effort to increase private lender
participation in farm loans to meet the credit needs of
farmers who suffered losses in the floods of 1993, the
FmHA has issued proposed regulations easing and
streamlining the collateral requirements for farm operating,
real estate and emergency loans. 59 Fed. Reg. 2307 (Jan.
14, 1994).
TOBACCO. The ASCS has issued proposed
regulations implementing the domestic tobacco content
requirement of Section 1106 of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993. 59 Fed. Reg. 1493 (Jan. 11,
1994).
WOOL . The CCC has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1993 support level for mohair at $4.738 per
pound. 59 Fed. Reg. 2283 (Jan. 14, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].*
Almost all of the decedent’s property was held in a trust
which became irrevocable upon the decedent’s death. The
trust income beneficiary and remainder holder was a
charitable organization. The decedent had made lifetime
gifts for which federal and state gift tax liability remained
unpaid at the decedent’s death. The estate failed to make its
federal and state estate tax payments on time and was liable
for accrued interest on the late taxes. The accrued gift taxes,
the interest on the late taxes and other administrative
expenses had to be paid from the trust assets because no
other estate property existed. The estate claimed that the
taxes and interest were paid from trust income and did not
decrease the amount of the charitable deduction. The IRS
ruled that the gift taxes paid pre-death by the decedent were
included in the gross estate but were not included in the
amount of the estate passing to the trust. The IRS also ruled
that the unpaid gift tax liability and the administrative
expenses were to be deducted from the trust principal
passing to the charity. The IRS also ruled that the interest
on the late taxes was not chargeable against the amount of
the estate passing to the charity, whether the interest was
paid from trust income or principal. Ltr. Rul. 9351001,
Aug. 27, 1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* An irrevocable testamentary trust was
established prior to September 25, 1985 and made one
beneficiary and an independent entity co-trustees. The
beneficiary could not participate in any decisions to make
discretionary distributions to the beneficiary. The
beneficiaries and co-trustees amended the trust to make a
grandchild co-trustee, also with the restriction on the
grandchild’s participation in any discretionary distributions
to the grandchild. The IRS ruled that the amended trust was
not subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9352013, Sept. 30, 1993.
TRUSTS. Under a testamentary trust, the taxpayer and
son were both income beneficiaries with the son as the
remainder holder and having a limited power of
appointment over trust corpus. The trust had the taxpayer
and a third party as trustees and granted the trustees the
power to distribute trust income at their discretion but
prohibited the taxpayer from participating in any decisions
to distribute trust income to the taxpayer. The independent
trustee resigned and the taxpayer and son created a new
trust with both beneficiaries as trustees. The new trust was
created by the son exercising the power of appointment in
favor of the taxpayer and the taxpayer creating the new
trust. Except for the loss of the power of appointment and
the new trustee provision, the new trust was identical to the
old trust. The IRS ruled that the transfer of the old trust
property to the new trust (1) was not a taxable sale, (2) was
not a taxable gift, (3) did not cause the trust property to be
included in the taxpayer’s gross estate, and (4) did not cause
the taxpayer and son to be treated as the owners of the trust
under I.R.C. §§ 671-677. Ltr. Rul. 9252005, Sept. 27,
1993.
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VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6]. * The decedent owned a
controlling interest in a communications company and the
estate valued the stock at $140 per share based upon the
price which would be obtained in a secondary public
offering. The court accepted the IRS valuation of $200 per
share based on the price obtainable at a private offering but
reduced the value to $178 because of the size of the
majority interest, the possibility of conflict with other
shareholders and FCC rules governing liquidation of the
company. Est. of Gray v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-
334.
Before the decedent’s death, the decedent owned stock,
cash assets and ranchland. Some of the stock was preferred
stock in a corporation with no assets in which the
decedent’s child and the child’s spouse were the only
directors. The decedent’s child and spouse recapitalized the
corporation, issuing voting and nonvoting common stock.
The child, exercising a power of attorney, transferred the
decedent’s assets to the corporation in exchange for the
nonvoting common stock. The corporation also executed an
employment agreement hiring the child’s spouse to run the
ranch, even though the spouse had little experience in
ranching and was otherwise employed as a teacher, at a
salary at least three times what would be normally paid for
an experienced ranch manager. The IRS ruled that the
excess salary was a constructive dividend which transferred
the decedent’s equity interest to the spouse; therefore, the
recapitalization and contribution of the decedent’s assets
were a gift to the extent of the excess salary and the gift was
to be valued under I.R.C. § 2704. Ltr. Rul. 9352001, Sept.
3, 1993.
The taxpayer created an irrevocable ten-year trust which
provided an annuity for the taxpayer of 7.5 percent of the
fair market value of the trust property at the creation of the
trust. The taxpayer was also to receive payments equal to
the amount of federal taxes incurred by the taxpayer
because the trust was a grantor trust. The taxpayer had the
power to substitute property of equal value but could not
contribute additional property. If trust income was
insufficient to pay the annuity, the difference was to be paid
from trust principal and any income in excess of the annuity
was to be added to principal. The trust property included S
corporation stock. The IRS ruled that no determination
could be made as to whether the trust income was taxable to
the taxpayer as a grantor/owner of the trust and whether the
trust was a QSST. The IRS also ruled that the taxpayer held
a qualified annuity interest for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702.
Ltr. Rul. 9352003, Sept. 23, 1993.  Similar annuity trusts
were also ruled to be a qualified annuity interest under
I.R.C. § 2702. Ltr. Rul. 9352007, Sept. 28, 1993; Ltr. Rul.
9352017, Sept. 30, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9351005, Sept. 16,
1993.
The taxpayer held voting preferred stock in two
corporations whose shares were held by the members of the
taxpayer’s family. The preferred stock had a restriction
created in 1984 under which the voting rights of the stock
would lapse if the taxpayer transferred the shares. The
corporations were merged and a new class of preferred non-
voting stock was issued for which the taxpayer exchanged
the voting preferred stock. The transfer caused a lapse in the
voting rights of the preferred stock; otherwise, the
taxpayer’s interest in the merged corporation equaled the
taxpayer’s total interests in the separate corporations. The
IRS ruled that the exchange of stock did not cause the stock
to be subject to I.R.C. § 2701 because the taxpayer only
changed the form of the interest in the entities. The IRS also
ruled that the exchange was not subject to I.R.C. § 2704
because the lapse of the voting rights occurred under a
restriction created prior to October 9, 1990. Ltr. Rul.
9352012, Sept. 29, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD-ALM § 4.01.* The IRS has
provided guidance on the mark-to-market rules of
accounting enacted by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993, including which taxpayers qualify as “dealers in
securities” under the new statute and which securities may
be exempt from being marked to market because the
securities are “held for investment.” The ruling also
discusses how taxpayers may change their accounting
method to the new method. Rev. Rul. 93-76, I.R.B. 1993-
35, modified by Rev. Rul. 94-7, I.R.B. 1994-3.
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES. The IRS has issued revised
procedures for deemed substantiation of employee expenses
for lodging, meals and other traveling expenses where the
employer provides a per diem allowance allowance for
expenses. The revised procedures also provide an optional
method for employers and self-employed individuals to
compute the deductible costs of business meals and other
travel expenses. Rev. Proc. 93-50, I.R.B. 1993-42, 24,
superseding, Rev. Proc. 93-21, I.R.B. 1993-13, 11.
The IRS has issued guidance for employers to determine
the taxable portion of parking, van pooling and mass transit
provided for employees. Up to $155 per month in parking
and $60 per month in van pooling and mass transit is tax
free to employees, with any additional amounts included in
employee gross income. After March 1994, the value of the
benefits must be determined according to what an
individual would pay for these benefits in an arm’s length
transaction. Notice 94-3, I.R.B. 1994-3.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was a
veterinarian who operated a cattle breeding activity and
goat-raising activity. The taxpayer was not allowed losses
associated with the cattle breeding business because no
animals were kept at the farm nor were other farming
activities carried on at the farm. The losses from the goat-
raising activity were also denied because the activity was
not engaged in for profit. Westbrook v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-634.
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer had disallowed investment interest for four taxable
years. In two of those taxable years, the taxpayer had net
operating losses which were also disallowed because the
taxpayer had a net taxable loss. The IRS argued that the
excess investment interest in the taxable loss years was not
allowed to be carried over to later taxable years with
investment income because the investment interest was
disallowed under the net operating loss rules of I.R.C. § 172
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and not the investment interest limitation rules of I.R.C. §
163. The court held that the two rules worked
independently, allowing disallowed investment interest
under Section 163 to be fully carried forward in taxable
years in which other business deductions were not allowed
because of a net taxable loss. Sharp v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,001 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff’g, 92-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,561 (Cl. Ct. 1992).
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer owned a
parcel of commercial real estate subject to a net lease. The
taxpayer was also a partner in a partnership which owned an
adjacent parcel of commercial real estate subject to a net
lease. Both properties were held for investment with the
owners providing few services for the tenants. Both
properties were transferred to the state under condemnation
proceedings and the taxpayer and partnership purchased as
tenants in common a third parcel of commercial real estate
subject to a net lease. The parties provided few services for
the tenant of the third property. The IRS ruled that under
Rev. Rul. 57-154, 1957-1 C.B. 262, the taxpayer could not
treat the new property as like-kind exchange property if the
interest in the new property was deemed an interest in a
partnership; however, because the parties provided no
services to the tenant other than usual to the tenant-landlord
relationship, the parties did not own the property as a
partnership and the taxpayer could treat its interest in the
new property as like-kind property.  Ltr. Rul. 9352008,
Sept. 29, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9352011, Sept. 29, 1993.
LETTER RULINGS.  The IRS has issued its annual
list of procedures and fees for issuance of rulings,
determination letters, information letters and closing
agreements. Some of the current fees are as follows:
   Type of request                                                                               Fee
Change in accounting period $250
Change in accounting method $600
All other rulings $3,000
For individuals, trusts, partnerships, corporations and
estates with total income of less than $150,000 and for
“Subchapter F-exempt Organizations” with gross receipts of
less than $150,000, some of the current fees are as follows:
   Type of request                                                                               Fee
Change in accounting period $250
Change in accounting method $500
All other rulings $500
Rev. Proc. 94-1, I.R.B. 1994-1, 10.
The IRS has issued its annual list of procedures for
furnishing technical advice to District Directors and Chiefs,
Appeals Offices. Rev. Proc. 94-2, I.R.B. 1994-1, 60.
    The IRS has issued its annual list of tax issues for which
the IRS will not give advance rulings or determination
letters. Rev. Proc. 94-3, I.R.B. 1994-1, 79.
The IRS has issued procedures for issuing determination
letters on the qualified status of employee plans under
Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7). Rev. Proc. 94-
6, I.R.B. 1994-1, 142.
The IRS has issued revised fee schedules for issuing
determination letters on the qualified status of employee
plans under Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7).
Rev. Proc. 94-8, I.R.B. 1994-1, 176.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION. The standard mileage rate
for 1994 is 29 cents per mile for business use, 12 cents per
mile for charitable use and 9 cents per mile for medical and
moving use. Rev. Proc. 93-51, I.R.B. 1993-51.
PENSION PLANS . The IRS has provided guidance for
amendment of plans to comply with the $150,000
compensation limit imposed by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, amending
I.R.C. § 401(a)(17). Rev. Proc. 94-13, I.R.B. 1994-3.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
DEFINITION. The IRS has issued a list of state limited
partnership laws which conform to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.
Rev. Rul. 94-2 I.R.B. 1994-1, 8.
DISTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has ruled that a deemed
distribution resulting from a decrease in a partner’s share of
partnership liabilities is treated as an advance or draw of
money to the extent of the partner’s distributive share of
partnership income. The IRS also ruled that advances or
draws are to be taken into account as of the end of the
partnership year.  Rev. Rul. 94-4, I.R.B. 1994-2, 20.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The IRS has
ruled that a business organized under the Oklahoma Limited
Liability Company Act could be taxed as a corporation or
partnership, but would be taxed as a partnership if the
articles of organization restricted the transferability of
interests and required the dissolution of the company upon
termination of a member’s interest unless all members agree
to continue the company. Rev. Rul. 93-92, I.R.B. 1993-42,
11.
The IRS has ruled that a business organized under the
Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act could be taxed as
a corporation or partnership, but would be taxed as a
partnership if the articles of organization restricted the
transferability of interests and required the dissolution of
the company upon termination of a member’s interest
unless all members agree to continue the company. Rev.
Rul. 94-5, I.R.B. 1994-2, 21.
TAX YEAR. The IRS has announced that partnerships
and S corporations which have elected under I.R.C. § 444 to
have a tax year other than that of their owners may be
required to increase the required deposit payment under
I.R.C. § 7519 because of the increase in the highest tax
bracket. Any payments due on May 15, 1994 are to be
based on the 39.6 percent rate plus one percent or 40.6
percent. Ann. 94-5, I.R.B. 1994-2.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. An S
corporation had dissolved but during the winding up period,
the corporation’s tax matters person signed an agreement to
extend the period of limitations on assessment of S
corporation tax items. The court held that a final S
corporation administrative adjustment filed within the
extension period was valid because the TMP continued to
have authority during the winding up period to manage the
corporation’s tax affairs. Paxiteles, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-622.
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STOCK BASIS. An S corporation shareholder was not
allowed to increase the basis of the shareholder’s stock by
the amount of an SBA loan made by the corporation and
collateralized by the shareholder’s personal assets. Allen v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-612.
An S corporation shareholder could not increase the
basis of the shareholder’s stock by the amount of a
corporation loan from a third party which was personally
guaranteed by the shareholder. The shareholder’s stock
basis could not be increased by the amount of loans to the
corporation which were unsubstantiated by records. Shaver
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-619.
TAX YEAR. The IRS has announced that partnerships
and S corporations which have elected under I.R.C. § 444 to
have a tax year other than that of their owners may be
required to increase the required deposit payment under
I.R.C. § 7519 because of the increase in the highest tax
bracket. Any payments due on May 15, 1994 are to be
based on the 39.6 percent rate plus one percent or 40.6
percent. Ann. 94-5, I.R.B. 1994-2.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
TERMINATION OF LEASE-ALM § 13.05[1].* The
parties were a landlord and a tenant who had a written farm
lease which expired by its terms on February 28, 1991, with
both parties waiving any notice of termination. After the
lease terminated, the parties entered into negotiations for
extending the lease, with the negotiations breaking down in
May 1991 and the landlord giving the tenant three days
notice to vacate under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-1401 et seq.,
25-21,219. The court held that neither statute applied to
agricultural leases and that, under common law, if the tenant
remains on the land after a terminated lease and the landlord
performs some action demonstrating acceptance of the
tenant, the lease becomes a year-to-year lease requiring six
months notice for termination. The case was remanded for
findings on this issue. Stuthman v. Stuthman, 507 N.W.2d
674 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
MORTGAGES
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. The defendants
borrowed money from the plaintiff and granted a security
interest in their farm as collateral for the loan. After the
defendants defaulted on the loan and the plaintiff sought
foreclosure, the defendants agreed to add another farm as
additional security in exchange for the plaintiff’s delay of
the foreclosure. After the defendants further defaulted on
their loan, the plaintiff purchased the first farm in a private
foreclosure action and sought judicial foreclosure of the
second farm. The defendants argued that the second
foreclosure violated Calif. Code of Civil Proc. § 580b which
prohibited deficiency judgments where the foreclosed
property is sold for less than fair market value. The court
held that the anti-deficiency statute did not apply where the
lender seeks foreclosure against additional collateral
voluntarily granted by the borrower without deception by
the lender. Western Farm Credit Bank v. Campbell, 861
P.2d 1041 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
VICARIOUS LIABILITY. The plaintiff was operating
a haystack mover owned by the plaintiff’s employer when
the plaintiff was injured. The mover was repaired by the
seller while the mover was under warranty and the seller
replaced a set screw with a protruding bolt which caught the
clothing of the plaintiff, causing the injuries. The plaintiff
sued the manufacturer of the mover for negligence, arguing
that the manufacturer was vicariously liable for the
negligent repair of the mover by the seller. The court held
that the manufacturer was not vicariously liable for the
repairs performed by the seller because the manufacturer
exercised no control over the seller’s repair methods, such
as training the mechanics. Zwingman v. Kallhoff, 507
N.W.2d 894 (Neb. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
JOINT VENTURE. The plaintiffs were the parents of
the defendants and both parties had discussed forming a
joint venture between the defendants and a corporation
owed by the plaintiffs to produce the 1990 potato crop. The
defendants owned all of the land but leased a portion of the
land to the plaintiffs. Before the crop was planted, the
defendants granted a security interest in the crop to a bank
which perfected the security interest. After the crop was
planted, the parties signed the joint venture agreement.
During the harvest, the plaintiff learned that the bank was
intercepting the crop proceeds under the security agreement
and the plaintiffs filed a processor’s lien because the
plaintiffs were processing some of the potatoes. The court
held that the bank’s security interest was valid because
N.D.C.C. § 41-09-24 allowed a perfection of a security
interest in crops prior to the planting of the crops. The court
also held that the formation of the joint venture did not
affect the security interest but that the security interest did
not attach to the crops grown on the land leased by the
plaintiffs. The court held that the processor’s lien was
invalid in that the corporation was only an alter ego of the
plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs could not file a lien against
their own crops. Thompson v. Danner, 507 N.W.2d 550
(N.D. 1993).
PERFECTION-ALM § 13.01[2].* The defendant
financed the 1991 corn and soybean crops through a
supplier and signed a UCC-1 financing statement which
listed the collateral crops, the names and addresses of the
parties and a description of the land on which the crops
were grown. The financing statement was properly filed in
1991. However, no written security agreement was made.
The plaintiff filed a judgment lien in 1992 against all of the
defendant’s property and claimed a priority security interest
in the proceeds of the 1991 crop. The court held that a
security agreement was necessary for perfection of the
security interest of the seed supplier and although a
financing statement may function as a security agreement,
the financing statement in this case could not function as a
security agreement because it had no words granting a
security interest in the crops. Gibson County Farm
Bureau v. Greer, 622 N.E.2d 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
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WILLS AND ESTATES
CROPS. At the decedent’s death, the decedent owned a
farm which was crop share leased to an unrelated party. On
the decedent’s death, the current crop had matured but had
not been harvested. The administration of the estate
encompassed two more crop years. The decedent’s will
bequeathed the residuary estate personal property to two
children and a friend. The will bequeathed a life estate in
the farm to the two children with the remainder to pass to a
charitable organization. The issue was whether the proceeds
of the crop share lease were personal property or income
from the real estate. The court held that because the will
specifically provided for the income from the farm to pass
to the children, the income from the farm after the
decedent’s death passed to the children only. However,
because the crops planted at the time of the decedent’s
death were matured, the crops were personal property to be
shared by all three parties under the will. Matter of Est. of
Hughes, 506 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
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